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COMMUNIS ANIMI CONCEPTIO
THE SELF-EVIDENT STATEMEN T
In his treatise De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, Lanfranc casti -
gates Berengar for basing his argument on premisses which are
neither self-evidently true, nor capable of being substantiated b y
other statements which are self-evidently true :
argumenti quippe locum necesse est, aut per se esse
certum, aut certis rationibus approbaturn I .
If the topics, or building-blocks, of argumentation are no t
sound, the most carefully-constructed edifice will fall down . For
Lanfranc and his immediate successors, at least, it seems that
these ` units of argument' fell, broadly, into two categories . The
statements of Scriptural, patristic, even secular auctores carried
an authority which meant that they required no corroborativ e
` proof' . Secondly, there were statements which were acceptabl e
to everyone because their truth was immediately recognisable ;
these were topics, or commonplaces .
The notion of the self-evident statement had a complex his -
tory. In Cicero's Topics and in Boethius' Commentaries on bot h
the Ciceronian and the Aristotelian Topics — as well as his ow n
monograph De Differentiis Topicis — mediaeval scholars found
discussions of the art of finding arguments (inventio) . These
arguments, or topics, carry weight in a discussion because o f
their general acceptability . R. McKeon has said that invention
` extends from the construction of formal arguments to al l
modes of enlarging reason by experience as manifested in awa-
reness, emotion, interest and appreciation ' 2 . The topic comes t o
claim assent at an emotional, as well as at a purely intellectua l
level, but its primary purpose is to appeal to a common sense o f
1. Chapter VII, PL 150,417.
2. ` Methods of Rhetorical and Philosophical Invention and Judgement ' Th e
Classical Tradition (in Honour of H . Caplan) ed. L
. Wallach, Ithaca, 1966,
p . 368 .
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` rightness ', because it appears on first hearing to be self-evi-
dently true .
We are here concerned, not so much with the recognition of
the meaning of single words, as with the recognition of the trut h
of a general statement, or of a common notion . Boethius had a
phrase for it, a phrase which he employed in the De Hebdomadi-
bus : communis animi concept/a . ` A common conception of th e
mind is a statement which anyone accepts as soon as he hear s
it ' 3 . Boethius distinguishes two kinds : the commonplace which
all men understand (ut omnium sit hominum), and that which
only the trained mind understands, but which is, in its turn ,
derived from ordinary commonplaces . To illustrate the first, he
cites an axiom of Euclid : if equals are taken from equals, th e
remainders are equal 4 . For the second, he suggests the state
-
ment that ` things which are incorporeal are not in space ' . Boe-
thius clearly has in mind the refined and abstracted self-eviden t
axiom or principle of a formal body of knowledge . Even the
simple can grasp primary axioms, although the more advanced
theorems which depend upon them may be evidently true onl y
to those who have studied and mastered the foundation prin-
ciples .
Boethius' twelfth century commentators follow his line o f
thought here . Gilbert of la Port-6e, in his commentary on the De
Hebdomadibus, enlarges :
Certum est quod et qui vocantur ` communes loci '
rhetorum et ` maxime propositiones ' dialecticorum e t
` theoremata' geornetrarurn et ` anxiomata' musicoru m
et ` generales sententiae ' ethicorum seu philosophoru m
continentur universalitate huius regule qua dicitur :
Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio qua m
quisque probat auditum 5 .
3. Theological Tractates, ed. H. F . Stewart, E . K. Rand, S. Tester, London,
1973, p
. 40, where the treatise is entitled Quomodo Substantiae.
4. Euclid Book I Axiom 3
.
5. Gilbert of POITIERS Commentaries on Boethius, ed. N. M. Häring,
Toronto, 1966, pp
. 189 .66-190.75 . M. D . Chenu notices both this reference and
that of Alan of Lille which follows, in Un essai de méthode théologique au
xii` siècle, in Revue de Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 24 (1935), pp . 259 -
267, where his interest lies in the notion of the rule or principle itself rather than
in that of the self-evident statement .
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In his view, the axioms of geometry, the principles and regulae
of every other art, are all self-evident commonplaces
. Alan of
Lille's Regulae Theologicae makes the same point :
et quasi quibusdam terminis certis clauduntur, ut dia-
lectica regulas habet quas maximas vocat, rhetoric a
locos communes, ethica generales sententias, physic a
aphorismos, arithmetica porisrnata, id est regulas sub-
tile . . . sunt et anxiomata musicorum, quae sunt regular
artis musicae, quae dicuntur anxiomata . . . 6 .
He emphasises that if the principles of the artes and of every
other branch of human learning are self-evidently true an d
universally recognizable in this way, then the axioms of theo-
logy, doctrinal principles, must have a compelling quality o f
self-evidentness which amounts to a categorical necessity :
Necessitas theologicarum maximarum absoluta est, e t
irrefragibilis, quia de his fidem faciunt quae actu, ve l
naturam, mutari non possint 7 .
Their cogency carries more than a persuasive force . It is impos-
sible not to recognise their rightness . But here, too, AIan is dea-
ling with abstract notions, generated by formal study, rathe r
than with commonplaces in the modern sense of the term ; these
are ` topics ' in a technical sense .
Thierry of Chartres' commentaries on Boethius take up seve-
ral of the points which have been made. In his remarks on th e
De Trinitate, he explains how the human mind conceives a n
idea, which it is capable of comprehending before it has th e
opportunity of connecting this abstraction with exterior or mate-
rial reality :
Animus enim concipit formam et compositionem ali-
cuius artificii formans id quod in mente est antequarn
connectat materie sed circa materiam S .
6. PL 210 : 621 .
7. Ibid.
8. Thierry of CHARTRES, Commentaries on Boethius, ed . N. M
. Haring ,
Toronto, 1971, p. 276 (De Trin. II : 34) .
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When he meets the corresponding reality, or when he hears a
statement, a man recognizes what he hears or sees . Thus Thier-
ry's remarks come close to Augustine's view of the nature o f
man's understanding of language. On the De Hebdomadibus
passage, Thierry's views are preserved in only a singl e
fragment 9 . Communis animi conceptio, he says, means what i s
self-evident : per se notum describit. What a man finds self-
evident is what he accepts as soon as he understands it :
quod quisque probat postquam illud intelligit .
` What we call self-evident is what this authority calls a commo n
conception of the mind ' . He renders Boethius' distinction bet-
ween the universally commonplace, and what is self-eviden t
only to the learned, as : per se notum absolute, and per se notu m
. . . inter doctos 10 . Up to a point this distinction may be said to
marry well with the difference between the axioms and prin-
ciples and rules of the arts and sciences, which are self-eviden t
only to the learned, and the general commonplaces with which
every student of rhetoric was taught to furnish himself as a
matter of course because of their universal appeal .
But both types of common conception — the simple and th e
advanced — fall into the category of self-evident statements ; th e
common proverb and the aduanced geometrical axiom are both
commonplaces in that they rest, ultimately, upon no proof ; they
are in themselves units of argument. Herein lies their interes t
and inportance in the study of mediaeval argumentation .
Mediaeval methods and techniques or argumentation hav e
always aroused interest ; perhaps less has been said about th e
grounds on which rested the ultimate authority of those com-
ponent statments which did not possess the auctoritas of a quo-
ted text, but which were manifestly acceptable to sheer com-
mon-sense : the communis animi conceptiones.
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